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Whose Values Count: Is a Theory of Social Choice for Sustainability Science Possible 
“…most debates over social policies, decisions, and actions are fundamentally 
disagreements over the relevance and priority of particular values” (Leiserowitz, 
Kates, and Parris, 2006, p. 440). 
 
Introduction: Social Choice in Sustainability Science 
 If sustainability science is to mature as a discipline (Kates, 2011), it will be important for 
practitioners to discuss and eventually agree upon the fundamentals of the paradigm on which the 
new discipline is based (Gardner, 2013).  The success of any emergent discipline is dependent 
upon clarity on the accepted elements of its paradigm.   For example, Spash (2012) challenged 
ecological economists to explore the “philosophy of science behind ecological economics” (p. 36) 
and confront the difficult questions of what should be the accepted ontology, epistemology, and 
methodologies of that new paradigm.  The same task confronts sustainability science.  While it is 
easy to argue what from the current disciplinary landscape should not be included in sustainability 
science, such as benefit-cost analysis (Anderson et al., 2015), it is more difficult to agree on what 
should be part of the new paradigm.  We offer here a continuation of this discussion, specifically 
an inquiry into one centrally important epistemological question to the paradigm: how do we 
know whose values count?  The answers to this question pose a significant problem for 
developing a theory of social choice for sustainability science. 
 Sustainability is fundamentally a normative assertion (Leiserowitz et al., 2006).  It is about 
what values will be expressed in private and public realms.  It is about tradeoffs among values, 
both within in the current generation and between current and future generations.  How society 
chooses the specifics among these tradeoffs, so-called social choice theory, is central to the 
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sustainability problem, and the very process of choosing is a choice that reflects different values 
(Bromley, 1998).   
There is a broad literature on social choice with notable foundations from Arrow (1963) 
and Sen (1970), which we are not going to review here.  Rather we will focus on the parts of the 
social choice question that are particularly relevant to sustainability science:  Is social choice 
theory a necessary part of sustainability science?  Whose values should count in making social 
decisions?  How should the multiplicity of values that exist be known (its epistemology) and used 
(its methodology) in that decision process?   Given the vast spatial domains and temporal domains 
at work in the sustainability problem, we need some means of reconciling the inevitably divergent 
choices depending on whose values we count, how we know what those values are, and how we 
count them in making social decisions.  In this way we are following the admonition of Arrow 
(1950), that we “…must look at the entire system of values, including values about values, in 
seeking a truly general theory of social welfare” (p. 334). 
 In the first part of the paper we review the role of social choice in sustainability science 
and the importance of values in that social choice process.  Next we discuss three temporal 
domains for values in social choice – the values of humans presently alive, values of those people 
from the past, and those of future humans.  Next we review some of the thinking on non-human 
values.  Then we discuss different ways values are weighted in current social choice processes 
and the problems with various current decision rules.  We conclude by borrowing from Rawls 




 The objective is to continue the process of developing a coherent philosophy of science 
for sustainability science (Spash, 2012; Gardner, 2013; Salas-Zapata et al., 2013; Anderson et al., 
2015).  The contribution of this paper is to construct a framework for developing social choice 
theory for sustainability science.  We offer an inventory of elements this theory should include 
and an outline of the approach to reconciling the tensions that exist among these elements.  We 
conclude with a note of caution about the potential barriers to constructing a theory of social 
choice for sustainability science. 
Sustainability Science as a Problem of Social Choice 
 The breadth of writing on sustainable development, sustainability, and sustainability 
science is staggering.  However, there is not yet coherence about the fundamental nature of these 
concepts.  Robinson (2004) reflected one important strand of thought when he argued “…that 
sustainability is necessarily a political act, not a scientific concept” (p. 382).  This idea of 
sustainability as essentially politics laid the foundation for his important work on the method of 
participatory backcasting  (Robinson et al. 2011).  However, much of the literature on 
sustainability science makes the claim that there is more to this than politics by another name.  
The claim is that there is a particular kind of science emerging. (See, for example, Kates et al. 
2001; Clark and Dickson 2003; Kates 2011). 
 The assertion of a science of sustainability is that there are future states of society that are 
more sustainable that others and that these are, in part, a result of decisions we make individually 
and collectively today.  Choice matters because, while not deterministic, sustainability is a future 
state of affairs that meets objectives for which there is increasing agreement in the literature.   A 
sustainable choice for society displays four attributes(Clark and Dickson 2003; White 2013): 
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 Meets the needs of people in the present 
 Meets the needs of people in the future 
 Reduces poverty 
 Conserves the planet’s life support systems 
These broad objectives may be met by many possible future states (see Anderson 2013, Figure 1, 
p. 45).  Society is faced with the problem of determining what actions today will lead us toward 
one of these sustainable future states, choices that would contribute to a sustainability transition 
(Leiserowitz et al. 2006).  Likewise we need to be able to identify what actions today move us 
away from sustainability.  How society effects this transition may look like the politics Robinson 
identifies, but determining what needs to happen is an open question for the science of 
sustainability.  One central challenge to developing this new type of science is the need for a 
social choice theory to determine just what future states meet the four objectives set for 
sustainability. 
 The call for such a social choice theory is echoed throughout the sustainability science 
literature, if not always using exactly the same language.  For example, Jerneck et al. (2001, p. 
72) describe a sequence of stages for learning about sustainability.  The sequence includes 1) 
scientific understanding, 2) sustainability goals, 3) sustainability pathways and strategies, and 4) 
implementation.  Stages two and three describe the key elements of social choice.  These stages 
reflect some of the key questions Kates (2001, p. 19450) poses for sustainability science.  Two of 
these questions describe social choice theory: 
“How can society most effectively guide or manage human-environmental systems toward 
a sustainability transition? 
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“How can the sustainability of alternative pathways of environment and development be 
evaluated?” 
These questions challenge the sustainability science community to develop a theory of social 
choice, a challenge echoed throughout the literature (Kates and Parris, 2003, p. 8067; 
Baumgartner and Quaas 2010, p. 448; Salas-Zapata et al. 2013,p. 609; Wiek at al. 2001, Table 2, 
p. 213; Gowdy 2005, p. 220). 
 In each case the authors recognize either explicitly or implicitly that the challenge for the 
sustainability science paradigm is to find a way to balance competing values inherent in the needs 
of the present, the needs of the future, and the preservation of environmental systems.  If the 
claims of sustainability science that it is a new paradigm are to be realized, a system of choice 
among different sets of values is necessary. 
Importance of Values in Public Policy 
 Almost 50 years ago John Krutilla (1967) and Garrett Hardin (1968), in two different 
ways, asserted the importance of values in public policy for issues we would now recognize as 
sustainability, even though the term was not used at that time.  Krutilla argued that the concept of 
conservation needed to be expanded to include values “for which the market fails to make 
adequate provision” (p. 778).  He went on to elucidate the importance of concepts economists 
would now recognize as option value, bequest value, and existence value (see Figure 1), 
suggesting that each of these entailed “…all of the problems of organizing a market for public 
goods…” (p. 782).  For him, because humans might hold these values for natural areas, there was 
a potential adverse effect on the welfare of future generations.  Society did not have the means of 
recognizing the values in the choices it made about natural area development.  Furthermore, 
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Krutilla asserted that “homogenized” conservation land alone would not be sufficient because of 
the diversity of “tastes” to be accommodated.  He recognized there are many different values to 
count and conflicts among these values need to be reconciled.   Society cannot avoid making 
choices. 
 Hardin’s (1968) famous article “The Tragedy of the Commons” was at its core about this 
social choice issue as well.  Hardin identified a category of problems for which there is “no 
technical solution,”  where, “A technical solution may be defined as one that requires a change 
only in the techniques of the natural sciences, demanding little or nothing in the way of change in 
human values or ideas of morality” (p. 1243).  In Hardin’s understanding, purely technical 
solutions to social problems imply we do not have to find a way to appreciate other people’s 
values or to devise a system of choosing among multiple values.  Yet, it appears to us that 
increasingly sustainability problems are in the Hardin no-technical-solution category and that we 
will need to confront this uncomfortable fact more directly.  Robinson (2004, p. 371) saw a basic 
division in those concerned with sustainable develop or sustainability as a split between being 
concerned with a “…technical fix or value change.”  We need to account for values when we 
make social choices, which makes us confront the questions:  whose values will we count and 
how will we count them? 
 To answer these questions we must know what we mean by values and whether there 
some commonality in how humans think about values?  Schwartz (1994, p. 20) defined a value as 
“…a (1) belief (2) pertaining to desirable end states or modes of conduct, that (3) transcends 
specific situations, (4) guides selection or evaluation of behavior, people, and events, and (5) is 
ordered by importance relative to other values to form a system of value priorities.”   This is 
consistent with the definition of values related to sustainability problems from Leiserowitz et al. 
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(2006), “…as abstract ideals that define or direct us to goals and provide standards against which 
the behavior of individuals and societies can be judged” (p. 418).  
Schwartz (1994, Figure 1, p. 24) argued that empirical research showed a near universal 
structure to the values humans.  While there may be a universal structure to how humans express 
values, there is difference among humans in which values are judged to be more important.  
“…(A)ctions taken in pursuit of each type of values have psychological, practical, and social 
consequences that may conflict or may be compatible with the pursuit of other value types” (p. 
23).  Economists would recognize this as a fundamental problem of tradeoffs. 
 For the individual, values are a central part of one’s world view1, “…a combination of a 
person’s value orientation and his or her view on how to understand the world and capabilities it 
offers, the lens through which the world is seen” (van Egmond and de Vries, 2011, p. 855).   
Individuals have different world views (ideologies), in part because they embrace different mixes 
of the value types Schwartz identified (Noblet et al., 2013).  Different world views make it 
difficult to accept what Hardin would have called technical arguments about problems.  Campbell 
and Kay (2014) showed that how individuals process technical information about a problem is 
affected by their world view or ideology, resulting in a “solution aversion.”  This is where 
“…solutions…are more aversive and more threatening to individuals who hold an ideology that is 
incompatible with or even challenged by the solution” (p. 809).  Values matter even in evaluating 
what are seemingly purely technical issues. 
 One central debate in the literature about human values is the extent to which they can 
change.  In the neoclassical economics tradition, individuals’ values (tastes) are assumed to be 
                                           
1 While economists and political scientists often refer to this idea as one’s world view, among social psychologists the 
term used more often is ideology.  We will use both terms interchangeably. 
8 
 
constant over time and the only things that change are prices, incomes, and information to 
consumers (Stigler and Becker, 1977).  Others, particularly those concerned with environmental 
values, suggest that values are not only subject to change but also need to change if we are to 
address sustainability problems. “…(I)f our values changed we would make decisions that are 
more protective of the biophysical environment” (Dietz et al., 2005, p. 336).  In the context of 
sustainability, “Global value change is considered essential…” (Leiserowitz et al., 2006, p. 417).  
Dunlap and colleagues (2000) argued that the expression of values through environmental world 
views is measurable and that those world views of some populations have changed in recent 
decades.  
 The measurement of values, as revealed through preferences, is central to neo-classical 
economic theory (Mishan, 1981).  During the last two decades of the 20
th
 Century, which values 
could be known and measured expanded, partly in response to Krutilla’s call to reconsider the 
idea of conservation.  While benefit-cost analysis (BCA) had been used as a social choice 
methodology for water management projects for decades (Atkinson and Mourato, 2008), there 
grew an interest in expanding which values would be included in BCA.  From this came the 
concept of total economic value (Randall, 1987).  This placed valuation of aspects of nature 
firmly in the domain of welfare economics and showed the growing recognition that valuation 
needed to include more than just market data (Just et al., 1982).  Applied economists developed 
new tools to measure the kinds of phenomena Krutilla had identified as central to conservation 
two decades earlier (Bishop, et al., 1987).  There was an explosion of literature around this idea of 
total economic value, both in terms of what it should include and in how to measure it beyond the 
use of market prices as indicators of value (Champ et al., 2003; Parks and Gowdy, 2013). 
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 After the introduction of the idea of total economic value, there was much debate over 
what value humans express about nature.  Figure 1 (adapted from Anderson and Teisl, 2013) 
presents a framework for understanding the diversity of values that might be counted in decision-
making for sustainability (see also Davidson, 2013).  Social choice in the welfare economics 
paradigm had been limited to measuring human-centered values of individuals, including mostly 
use-based values from consumption and from non-consumptive use (I.A.1. in Figure 1).  These 
were usually measured from market data.  The innovations from non-market valuation mentioned 
above, allowed for the expansion of the measurement of values to include other individual values, 
both use-based and non-use-based, like those identified by Krutilla (I.A.2. in Figure 1).  So now 
we can think of measuring the value of a tree, for example, as firewood (consumptive use), as a 
place to sit and enjoy nature (non-consumptive use), as a store of energy for future use (option 
value), as a gift to future humans (bequest value), or the good feeling knowing that there are trees 
on Earth (existence value). 
 Norton (2005) argued that this approach was still too narrow because it focused on 
individuals (“methodological individualism,” p. 203-204) and ignored values held communally, 
which might include value associated with both nature and culture (I.B. in Figure 1).  Values of 
this type were also referred to as “shared and social values” which Kenter et al. (2015) described 
as multidimensional (p. 89). 
Others have argued that there are values intrinsic to the natural world that might be called 
biocentric values (Nash, 1989).  These are aspects of nature that are valuable without reference to 
humans and may focus on individual organisms (the tree as having the right to enjoy its own 
existence), species (the tree as part of biodiversity), or whole ecosystems (the tree as part of the 
function of the system) (II. in Figure 1).  It is difficult to speak of intrinsic values in ways 
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comparable to considering anthropocentric values (Norton, 2005, pp. 161-166), but it is important 
to recognize that both broad types of value are potentially part of social choice processes for 
sustainability science. 
 The possibility that many different types of value exist is a challenge for sustainability 
science.  Sustainability is often depicted as a Venn diagram (for example Parkin, 2000) where the 
intersection of social, environmental, and economic pillars of sustainability yields a magical 
sustainability area.  Given the diversity of values expressed by humans, we are skeptical that there 
is such a sweet spot to be found.  We agree with Leiserowitz et al. (2006) that, “Although nearly 
all participants may agree in the abstract about the importance of each of these three “pillars,” 
there are clearly strong tensions between these values, which often underlie the heated debates 
over concrete decisions and actions (p. 440).”  Values matter fundamentally and thus 
sustainability largely is a “no technical solutions” problem.  It is also a problem that has a strong 
temporal dimension because of sustainability’s inherent intergenerational concern (Anderson, 
2013). 
Values: Past, Present, and Future 
 As an intergenerational concern different from traditional welfare models, the practice of 
sustainability science needs to consider values across the temporal domain.  Social choice has 
been dominated by neoclassical economic theory of welfare economics (Just et al., 1982).  In this 
paradigm, several assumptions are made about the temporal dimension of whose values count.  
Market data are the first choice for measuring values because they are deemed to be valid and 
reliable in that they are revealed preferences of consumers.  Individuals are considered to be the 
best judges of what is valuable to them and their actual behavior in markets is the most reliable 
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indication of their underlying preferences.  Furthermore, preferences are assumed to be fixed, 
sometimes referred to as being exogenous to the decision process and not affected by the context 
within which the preferences are expressed (Stigler and Becker, 1977).   
Critics of this model suggested that the assumption of the “sanctity of individual choice” 
at the heart of the neoclassical model is flawed.  “Evidence from behavioral economics, 
psychology, neuroscience, and evolutionary biology point to the need for an alternative to the 
neoclassical model of human behavior based on the fact that human values are social not 
individual (Parks and Gowdy, 2013, p. e8).  The implication of this is that “…there may be a 
social interest in influencing individual preferences…” (Norton, et al. 1998, p. 194).  This 
perspective assumes that preferences are not fixed, particularly for public policy, a perspective 
increasingly supported by experimental findings (Quoidbach et al., 2013; Zaval, et al., 2015; 
Noblet et al., 2015). 
 What counts in market transactions are ex ante values, as expressed through consumers’ 
preferences revealed before purchase decisions.  These are understood as consumers’ willingness 
to pay for a good or service.  We know from behavioral economics research that this value is 
different from the preferences that consumers would express for the same good if they already 
owned it and were willing to sell (Kahneman et al., 1991).  Since market data cannot easily 
capture values other than willingness to pay before the fact, those are the values used.  
 Nonmarket valuation (Champ et al, 2003) was developed to estimate the equivalent to 
market data for values generally not captured through market transactions, like those values that 
Krutilla (1967) was concerned with.   These include estimates of the monetary value of 
conserving a resource in case it might be useful in the future (option value) or just because we feel 
good knowing the resources is there even though we do not want to use it (existence value).  
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While non-market valuation broadened the realm of preferences included in social choice, these 
preferences were limited conceptually to the same temporal scope as market data, willingness to 
pay for a good or service prior to consumption (Knetsch, 1990). 
 For people concerned about “intergenerational moral obligations” (Norton, 2005, p. 321), 
this use of market data for assigning values in social choice models is one form of “presentism.”  
The values that we can know are those based on willingness to pay of present consumers before 
consumption, weighted by income.  Past and future values do not count in the same way in our 
current approach to social choice. 
 This is not to say that the values of past humans are completely irrelevant in social choice 
models, though they are usually captured in terms of limited constraints on the current decision 
set from past actions.  The most fundamental way this is seen is in constitutionalism, the idea that 
future decisions in a democracy are constrained by the rule of law codified in common law or in a 
written constitution.  So in the United States the rules of political, social, and economic decision-
making are constrained by the framework in a written constitution.  It is not that the rules are 
unchangeable, but change is subject to interpretation by the judicial system and to rules for 
changing the original language that are cumbersome and rely on assent of a super majority.  The 
impact of past values on social choice through legal mechanisms obviously varies from one 
political culture to another.  For example, in the system in the United Kingdom, where there is no 
written constitution, no Parliament may bind a future Parliament in the way that the founders in 




 While less constraining than written constitutions, other legal instruments are used to 
preserve values of the past into the future.  Conservation easements and other deed restrictions 
constrain future land use, although what is allowed and the extent to which such property rights 
are honored varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction (Morris, 2008).  Even in the United States 
where there is robust recognition of the importance of honoring such restrictions in property 
records, courts may still choose to suspend these past judgments of value and override such deed 
restrictions. Attempts to codify bequests or legacies are always subject to the possibility that those 
in the future will decide it is not in their best interests to honor such attempts (Anderson, 2013).  
Constraints imposed by the past can be overridden by those in the present, though not always 
easily. 
 Golub et al. (2013) argue that the past also has a stake when social choice entails elements 
of past injustices.  Such a restorative justice ethic reflects an understanding that 
“…intergenerational equity can reflect a concern for previous generations as much as it can for 
future ones” (p. 260).  
Finally there is one area where the past is clearly disenfranchised in the current approach 
to social choice, the arena of sunk costs and benefits.  In benefit cost analysis, costs that have 
been incurred and benefits that have been enjoyed in the past are assumed to be irrelevant to 
decisions about the future.  The process is to start the measurement of benefits and costs in the 
present and then look forward, not back.  This principle is so obviously accepted that it is rarely 
even discussed in the social choice literature.  Use of past benefits and costs in decision making is 
simply assumed to be irrational behavior in neoclassical theory.   
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Thinking about the future is treated differently from thinking about the past, at least to the 
extent that the future is relevant to those alive in the present who will live at least some time into 
the future.  Social choice in current practice does look forward, but in a very limited way.  The 
preferences of the future, if anything, are assumed to be the same as those of the present measured 
by the ex ante willingness to pay of present consumers.  In neoclassical economics, “…the tastes, 
the preferences, of future generations are something that we don’t know about. …all we can do in 
this respect is to imagine people in the future being much like ourselves…” (Solow, 1993, p. 
191).  Even critics of the neoclassical model take this approach.  For example Bromley (1998) 
said that “We cannot know future tastes and preferences…” (p. 234), but for him this means that 
we cannot assume that future preferences will be like the preferences of the present.  Norton 
(2005, p. 322) called this the “ignorance of values problem.” 
 Others have argued to the contrary that there are means for the present to know more 
about the values of the future.  Vergrat and Quist (2011) suggested that backcasting is one way to 
do this.  In this approach the task of those in the present is to imagine a desirable future and 
working back to the present to identify the path from now to that desirable future.  This is akin to 
Bromley’s (1998) concept of a “…constructed order defining a socially acceptable program now 
into the future.”   Robinson et al. (2011) argued that this backcasting should be participatory, 
which gives the process an important “social learning element.”  In another approach, Anderson et 
al. (2012) proposed retrospective assessment where people in the present judge past decisions as a 
model for developing insights into how the future would respond to the actions of the present, 
how their preferences might change.  In this vein of the future as stakeholders, a recent court case 
in the U.S. Commonwealth of Massachusetts on the divestment of stocks in fossil fuel companies 
by college endowment funds explicitly asserts that future generations should have standing in 
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some public policy issues, whether or not we are clear on the exact nature of their preferences 
(Harvard Climate Justice Coalition v. Presidents and Fellows of Harvard College). 
 Present thinking about the future is not a function of unchanging preferences.  Empirical 
evidence shows that retrospective assessment does change how people respond to public policy 
proposals about future resource allocations (Noblet et al., 2015).  Moreover a growing body of 
evidence shows that humans underestimate how much their values are likely to change in the 
future (Quoidbach et al., 2013).  This suggests more broadly that current values are poor proxies 
for future values, whether the values of those currently alive who will live into the future or the 
values of those humans who are not yet alive. 
 Whether the preferences of the future are assumed to reflect those of the present or they 
are different in some meaningful way, an additional question is how far into the future we are 
going to peer in making our choices.  Norton (2005, p. 321) calls this the “distance problem.”  
Were we to include the future in social choice models, how many generations into the future to 
consider would be an open question. 
Non-Human Values in Decisionmaking 
 Perhaps even more problematic than determining which anthropocentric values are to be 
counted is the question of non-human values.  The literature on biocentric or intrinsic values of 
nature is vast and rich, and it is well documented elsewhere (Palmer et al., 2014; Norton, 2005, 
Chapter 2).  For our purposes, one central question in social choice for sustainability science is:  
what non-anthropocentric values should be used in sustainability policy?  In many ways, 
sustainability is a human-centered idea.  In the classic Brundtland definition, sustainable 
development is “…development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
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ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED, 1987).  The focus on meeting 
intra- and inter-generational human needs implicitly includes instrumental values of aspects of the 
natural environment (I. in Figure 1).  Even existence value, which is often confused with intrinsic 
value, is clearly human centered.  This is the value humans get from knowing that some aspect of 
nature exists whether or not they care to use that aspect, study it, worship it, or make it available 
to future generations. 
 More difficult in sustainability science is whether intrinsic values of nature should be 
considered in making social choices.  By intrinsic value we mean value of aspects of nature in and 
of itself, without reference to humans, one of several different meanings that environmental 
ethicists ascribe to the term (Palmer, et al. 2014, p. 422).  Even if sustainability scientists opt for 
using these values in social choice, there remains the question of in what way these values should 
be considered.  Is it the individual organism, a species, or the whole ecosystem that is the unit of 
analysis for value? (See Section II in Figure 1; see also Palmer, et al., 2014, pp. 426-429.) 
 Biocentric values remain controversial, even among environmentalists.  Norton (2005, p. 
180-190) argued from the perspective of environmental pragmatism that thinking about a 
dichotomy between anthropocentric values, economism in his terminology, and intrinsic value 
theory is misplaced.   Pragmatists argue that both approaches lead to similar, if not identical 
outcomes in policy, so it is better to avoid a sharp theoretical distinction in types of values and 
focus on outcomes instead.  Others argued that humans have so changed nature, domesticated it, 
that the focus should be on the ways in which we can manage domesticated nature to best provide 
for human welfare (Kareiva et al., 2007).  Implicit in this argument is that domesticated nature has 
lost its intrinsic value and need not be considered in social choice processes. 
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 Thus, at least four broad categories of values might be included in social choice processes 
in sustainability science.   These are: values of humans past, present, and future, and values 
associated with nature without reference to humans.  Even after deciding which values should be 
included in social choice for sustainability science, two problems remain.  First is whether or how 
to weight these values in a decision process, and second is what decision rules should be applied 
in the use of diverse, and probably conflicting, values.  The weighting problem is not new, it has 
long been recognized in the social choice literature. 
Weighting Values for Social Choice in Sustainability Science 
  It not only matters who values count, but also matters how the values used in decision 
making are weighted. The paradigm of neoclassical welfare economics has become the dominant 
paradigm for social choice in the past fifty years.  The paradigm is operationalized through benefit 
cost analysis (BCA), although this is not without critics (Padilla, 2002; Gowdy, 2005; Parks and 
Gowdy, 2013; Anderson et al., 2015).  Different values are weighted in the methodology, 
sometimes explicitly, other times implicitly.   
First of all, values are weighted in terms of measurability, what Hardin (1968, p. 1244) 
called the commensurability issue.  In current practice if a value can be expressed in monetary 
terms it is included; if it cannot be monetized it becomes at best part of informal political 
processes around the use of BCA (Atkinson and Muorato, 2008).  By definition, this leaves 
intrinsic values of nature out of consideration.  These values certainly cannot be captured in 
monetary terms and are likely not to be measurable in any meaningful sense.  The very act of 
measurement probably moves them from the realm of intrinsic value to that of anthropocentric 
values.   
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 Values are weighted using incomes of individuals in BCA, with the values of higher-
income individuals getting higher weights and the values of lower-income individuals, of which 
there are more, getting lower weights (Just et al. 1982).  This is because the method uses market 
prices to value traded good or market price analogs for non-market goods and services.  Market 
prices assume the current distribution of income in assigning monetary values to goods and 
services; those with higher incomes get more “votes” in the marketplace.  Techniques for non-
market valuation also give more weight to the values (preferences) of higher income individuals 
because these techniques were designed to be analogous to market valuation. 
 Values of the past are completely excluded from this analysis under the sunk cost dictum: 
“Economic theory implies that only incremental costs and benefits should affect decision.  
Historical costs should be irrelevant” (Thaler, 1980, p. 47).  This is notwithstanding experimental 
evidence for a sunk cost effect in individual human behaviors; that is people recognize sunk costs 
in making personal decisions (Arkes and Blumer, 1985).  The welfare economics framework 
assumes that rational economic behavior is to only use present and future costs and benefits for 
social choice.  Past cost and benefits are assumed to be irrelevant to social choice processes, even 
those costs incurred or benefits enjoyed just yesterday.  Another way to state this is to say that in 
social choice zero weight is given to values of the past.  Holding to this rigidly would mean re-
calculating social choice models repeatedly because yesterday’s costs and benefits are no longer 
relevant.  This codifies the present point in time bias in the BCA methodology.  As Mishan (1981, 
p. 507) said, “…the outcome of a cost benefit analysis will depend, in general, upon the reference 
point in time chosen.  Since no purely economic consideration favors one point of time over 
another, the choice of any one point of time, such as the present, is arbitrary.”  
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 Sunk costs and benefits still play an indirect and limited role in current social choices 
processes.  They provide information for both individual and social learning.  Individual 
preferences for future consumption are shaped by past consumption experiences of the same or 
similar goods or services.  While this has some effect at the personal level, historians have argued 
that there has not been similar use of history, which would include understandings of sunk costs 
and benefits, in collective decision processes for public policy (Guldi and Armitage, 2014). 
Current social choice models treat the values of the future differently than the past.  The 
values of the future, therefore the monetary values of costs and benefits, are assumed to be like 
those of the present as we discussed above.  However, those future costs and benefits are 
discounted (see Padilla, 2002; Atkinson and Mourato, 2008).   That is, they are given less weight 
the further one projects into the future.  These two ways of treating the values of the future both 
reflect the phenomenon of presentism in the current approach to social choice (Norton, 2005, p. 
321).  
 Since different values clearly may be in conflict with each other (Schwartz 1994, p. 23), 
how we weight values clearly will matter in social choice.  Perhaps even more important are the 
decision rules applied once various types of values are weighted. 
Decision Rules for Social Choice in Sustainability Science 
 Regardless which values are chosen for making decisions and how those various values 
are weighted, to make social choices there must be some rule for making public policy decisions 
about sustainability.  Social choice theory for sustainability science requires a decision rule to 
evaluate competing policy options.  Does a given policy contribute to a sustainability transition or 
not? The first question in terms of decision rules is that of the unit of analysis.  In current social 
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choice models, like neoclassical welfare economics, decision rules assume that some accounting 
of individual values can be used to understand what is best for the collective.  Norton (2005) 
called this methodological individualism.  “Applied to normative analysis, the principle of 
methodological individualism implies that all benefits or goods must be understood as benefits or 
goods of individuals” (p. 238).  He argued that some relevant values might be held and expressed 
communally rather than just individually (Figure 1 segment I.B.). 
 In the currently dominant paradigm, the decision rules use individual values in a benefit 
cost analysis (BC) framework.  The BCA approach uses a utilitarian perspective to do this 
(Rawls, 1971, pp. 22-27).  The approach asserts that a choice is unequivocally desirable as long as 
some people are made better off and no one is made worse off, a so-called Pareto improvement 
(Just et al., 1982, chapter 2).  Since most choices impose costs on some people and generate 
benefits for others, Pareto improvements are not common.  To solve this problem, a compensated 
Pareto improvement is one where those who gain welfare from a policy choice are able to 
compensate losers for their costs and still experience a net improvement in welfare.  Since such 
compensation is difficult to accomplish in the real world, welfare economics adopted the so-
called Kaldor-Hicks rule (Mishan, 1981, pp. 302-312; Farrow 1998).  Under this construct, 
society is assumed to be better off from a policy choice if winners could compensate losers even 
when such compensation is not made.  This can be thought of as a “sum of utilities” decision rule 
for social choice (Arrow, 1973). 
 In the welfare economics framework as traditionally applied, the market was assumed to 
achieve this utilitarian outcome as long as market failures were addressed (get the “right” prices 
to measure costs and benefits) and the future’s interests are assumed to be captured by present 
measures of utility.  Bromley (1998) argued that this assumption of a “spontaneous order” fails to 
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meet the expectations inherent to sustainability for what the future might expect from us.  His 
alternative is a “constructed order” in an “overlapping generations model.”  “The idea of rights-
based sustainability recognizes that provisioning must occur within, that is constrained by, a prior 
specification of institutions that will protect the interests of future persons.  The notion of social 
bequests, protected by a regency, is consistent with this concept of rights-based sustainability” (p. 
239).  Bromley’s constructed order admonishes us to consider the interests of the future, but does 
not provide the concrete decision rules on how to accomplish this when there is the inevitable 
conflict among the values of the diverse parties interested in these processes, what Norton (2005, 
p. 200) termed moral pluralism. 
 Early critics of the neoclassical economics decision rules proposed multi-stage decision 
models as ways to solve some of the problems identified in the neoclassical model.  Page (1977, p 
203 ff.) suggested that conflicts between criteria for conservation and economic efficiency could 
be reconciled by apply the conservation criterion first (a guarantee of “permanent livability”).  
This would then set the constraints within which economic efficiency criteria could be applied.  
This approach by Page was extended by Norton (1989) when he developed criteria for thinking 
about what should be conserved first.  Padilla (2002, p. 79) developed this even further with a 
multi-step evaluation process that explicitly filters types of decisions for their intergenerational 
and sustainability effects. 
An alternative to market-based decision rules is to think about “democracy” as the 
procedure for reconciling value differences, particularly those between generations.  “It is 
possible to retain a commitment to democracy and to discuss the appropriateness of values 
because the democratic commitment is mainly procedural, while assertions of appropriateness are 
put forward as empirically and morally supportable theses regarding what our obligations to the 
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future are” (Norton et al., 1998, p. 200).  This is another way of thinking of discourse as a 
possible means of reducing community conflict over values through “deliberative rationality” 
(Deitz et al., 2005, p. 363-364).  A natural extension of this was the idea of “participatory 
valuation” (Parks and Gowdy, 2013, p. e8).  Particularly challenging is how to include the future 
in such deliberative democratic processes (Ekeli, 2005). Again, though, this falls short of 
providing a coherent set of decision rules for choosing among conflicting values once we have 
chosen which values are to be counted.  Democratic processes with majoritarian decision rules 
can have similar effects to utilitarianism in terms of how values are weighted.  These approaches 
are more consistent with the idea of sustainability as another form of politics (Robinson, 2002). 
 Perhaps most promising for dealing with diversity of values is multi-criteria decision 
making (Wang, et al., 2009), where decision makers must specify the values to be counted, the 
weights to be used, and the decision rules to be applied.  One important aspect of this approach is 
that it forces explicit consideration of the decision process’s elements and allows sensitivity 
analysis of different decisions about what to count and how to count them.  But that still leaves 
open the question of what process should be adopt for making these decisions about how to 
decide?  Rawls’ theory of justice offers a way to think about this problem. 
An Approach to Deciding How to Decide 
 The fundamental problem in deciding how to decide is that of self  interest.  Given the 
temporal and spatial dimensions of sustainability and the diversity of values types described 
above, there is a challenge in choosing social choice models that do not serve the interests first of 
the choosers.   It is natural for humans to focus on aspects of our lives that are closer both 
spatially and temporally.  But in choosing how to choose, it would be fair if the process were to 
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transcend this self interest.  Rawls (1971), in his seminal theory of justice,  argued for beginning 
with an “original position” such “… that no one should be advantaged or disadvantaged by 
natural fortune or social circumstances in the choice of principles” (p. 18).  The problem of 
choosing the principles that would lead to justice is analogous to the problem of choosing whose 
values should count and how they should be counted for sustainability science. 
 Rawls proposed for his theory of justice that those in this original position would be 
behind a “veil of ignorance.”  Among other things, they would not know their particular class, 
natural abilities, intelligence, risk aversion, cultural context, or even which generation they belong 
to.   “These broader restrictions on knowledge are appropriate in part because questions of social 
justice arise between generations as well as within them…They must choose principles the 
consequences of which they are prepared to live with whatever generation they turn out to belong 
to” (p. 137).  This Rawlsian approach is directly applicable here. 
 Imagine we were ignorant of our personal circumstances, our gender, nationality, income, 
intelligence, beauty, health, or generation we lived in.  Imagine further that we did not know our 
particular world view (ideology) and the values that underlie that world view.  All we know is 
what Rawls proposed for his original position.  “…they know the general facts about human 
society. They understand political affairs and the principles of economic theory; they know the 
basis of social organization and the laws of human psychology” (p. 137). 
 Given this as a starting point, we can imagine how rational people might structure a 
system of social choice.  Values of “the future” would not be discounted, because we would not 
what the future is -- we are ignorant of the generation we are in.  Likewise, we would not ignore 
the values of the past; there are no sunk costs if we do not know our generation.  We would avoid 
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the bias of presentism by not knowing what is, in fact, the present.   From the original position it 
would be rational to not weight values by wealth or income because we would not know our own 
personal economic circumstances.    
 In the most radical version of the veil of ignorance (not one Rawls adopted), we would not 
know our species.  While it is hard to imagine other species as part of the process for choosing the 
principles upon which to build social choice processes (Nagel 1974), it is one way of 
acknowledging the legitimacy of intrinsic values of nature. 
 Furthermore, under the veil of ignorance we might argue for decision rules that protect the 
values of minority perspectives from absolute dominance by majorities.  The problem of minority 
perspectives has long plagued political theorists.  In defending the proposed new U.S. 
Constitution, Madison (1961) in Federalist paper No. 10 addressed the problem of “faction,” a 
group with a particular world view in our terms.  The fear even in democracy was “…that the 
public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often 
decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior 
force of an interested and overbearing majority (Madison, 1961, p. 77).   For him the recognition 
and protection of minority interest was achieved in the structure of a republican form of 
government designed in the U.S. Constitution.  In a theory of social choice these protections need 
include both how decisions are made and what issues or things are so important that they are set 
aside from decision processes before they begin (Page 1977; Norton, 2005). 
 This approach based on Rawls’ original position does not get us all the way to a coherent 
framework for social choice in sustainability science.  It does not provide us with an obvious 
practical alternative to BCA.  It leaves more clarity on what we would not do than on what we 
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should on in making social choices for sustainability.  What it does is help us understand the ways 
that this new paradigm might offer meaningful alternatives for addressing social problems in light 
of the diversity of human values.  It establishes the principles for evaluating any proposed social 
choice frameworks that purport to lead to sustainable outcomes.  
Conclusions 
 Achieving sustainability is a problem of choice in a complex social system nested in even 
more complex biophysical systems.  The choices we make about the economic, social, and natural 
aspects of human existence start with values.  Indeed, the very definition of sustainable outcomes 
is a normative judgment based on what values count and how they are counted. 
 This is first a problem of epistemology for sustainability science.  How can we know the 
range of relevant values that should be considered?  Beyond this is the greater challenge of 
choosing a framework for social choice once we have decided what values will count.  This is in 
itself a value-laden problem in that the weighting of inevitably conflicting values and selection of 
decision rules are both values-based.  Sustainability science is a long way from offering a 
paradigm that addresses these epistemological and methodological problems adequately. 
 The starting point for defining the paradigm for social choice will be to remove self-
interest from the process of choosing the choice mechanism.  To accomplish this, a Rawlsian 
approach, where we think about the problem as if we were behind a “veil of ignorance,” is the 
starting point for removing self interest from social choice theory and working toward practical 
methodology for making social choices. 
 That said, there is one last outcome to consider, the potential impossibility of a theory of 
social choice for sustainability science.  While we can easily identify social choice processes that 
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will not satisfy the criteria that we meet the needs of the present without jeopardizing the ability 
of the future to meet its own needs, that does not necessarily mean that it is possible to construct a 
social choice process that will assure this.  Just as Arrow (1950) identified the impossibility of 
constructing a social welfare function in the welfare economics framework, a similar 
impossibility theory may well apply here.  If we are to avoid this outcome, sustainability science 
must confront the problem of values and recognize the difficulty we face in reconciling the 
competing claims on our social and natural systems.  Any practical framework for making social 
choices that lead to more sustainable futures must address these challenges. 
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